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Abstract
The World Bank estimates that over one billion people currently lack official identity documents. To tackle this crucial
issue, the United Nations included the aim to provide legal identity for all by 2030 among the Sustainable Development
Goals. Technology can be a powerful tool to reach this target. In the digital age, new technologies increasingly mediate
identity verification and identification of individuals. Currently, State-led and public–private initiatives use technology to
provide official identification, to control and secure external borders, and to distribute humanitarian aid to populations in
need. All of these initiatives have profound implications for the protection of human rights of those affected by them.
Digital identity technologies may render individuals without legal documentation more visible and therefore less vulner-
able to abuse and exploitation. However, they also present risks for the protection of individuals’ human rights. As they
build on personal data for identification and identity verification, data protection and privacy rights are most clearly
affected. The prohibition of discrimination in the digital space is also of concern as these technological advances’ societal
impact is not yet fully understood. Accordingly, the article argues that emerging digital identity platforms will only
contribute to the protection of human rights if the providers adequately mitigate any risks of potential discrimination
and promote high standards of privacy and data protection.
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Introduction
A valid proof of legal identity is often a prerequisite for
accessing many basic services including healthcare,
social protection, banking or education (World Bank,
2018a). Presently, over one billion people still lack ways
of proving legal identity (World Bank, 2017a). Such a
situation is primarily due to the absence of birth regis-
tration in less developed countries, statelessness, or the
loss of documentary evidence. Technology can help
address this problem, by providing digital tools for
identity verification and identification.
This article evaluates the implications that such digi-
tal identity technologies can have for the protection of
human rights. It places the analysis within the frame-
work of international human rights law (IHRL) and
data protection instruments such as the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). The article argues that
albeit worthwhile, digital identity platforms will only
contribute to the protection of human rights if the
providers adequately mitigate any risks of potential dis-
crimination and promote high standards of privacy and
data protection.
Prioritising legal identity for all
In law, everyone has the right to be recognised as a
person (Article 6, UDHR; Article 16, ICCPR; Article
24, ACHR; Article 3, ACHPR) and to be treated
equally before the law without any form of discrimin-
ation (Articles 1, 2 and 7, UDHR; Article 26, ICCPR;
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Article 14, ECHR; Article 1, ACHR; Article 2,
ACHPR). Similarly, every child has the right to be
registered at birth (Article 24, ICCPR; Article 7, CRC).
In practice, however, substantive equality (Fredman,
2016) is compromised when individuals who are for-
mally entitled to equal treatment are materially
unable to access their rights due to the lack of proof
of identity. Without a birth certificate, children face
additional difficulties in access to education. Similarly,
asylum-seekers without documentary evidence of their
identity and age may incur significant problems in
acquiring legal status in a host country.
Therefore, verifying legal identity is not an easy task
for those who have not been registered at birth or for
those who lack legal documentation. Those individuals
tend to concentrate in Sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2016; World Bank,
2017b). To tackle this major challenge, the United
Nations included the aim to provide legal identity for
all by 2030 among the Sustainable Development Goals
(UN SDGs) in Target 16.9. Technology can be a
powerful tool to reach this target.
Bridging the identity gap with digital
technologies
In the digital age, new technologies increasingly medi-
ate identity verification and identification of individuals
(Sullivan, 2016, 2018). Life factors including date and
place of birth, origins, ethnicity, nationality and bio-
logical features such as eye and hair colour are still
commonly used. However, biometric data such as fin-
gerprints and iris scans have a prominent place in iden-
tity verification and identification. For example,
biometric passports have become a standard tool for
a variety of states (Torpey, 2018). Another example is
India’s Aadhaar programme, which uses biometric
technology to record fingerprints and iris scans in add-
ition to personal information such as name, date of
birth and domicile (Abraham, 2018). Biometric tech-
nology is also used for border control and migration
management in the European Union (Eurodac
Regulation).
More recently, we saw the emergence of solutions
combining biometrics and blockchain technologies for
digital identification. Blockchain uses decentralised dis-
tributed ledger technology (Swan, 2015) which can be
an advantage for digital identity providers as data is
not stored in a single central database (Tapscott,
2017). Instead, the data is encrypted and recorded in
the different blocks of the chain, making it challenging
to delete or tamper with the information stored in it
(Finck, 2018). However, this also means that any per-
sonal information directly stored in the chain cannot be
easily removed (Zyskind, 2015), creating challenges for
data protection. Similarly, blockchain is not exempt
from security concerns, as for example, private keys
may be stolen by hackers or lost (Iuon-Chang and
Tzu-Chun, 2017; Swan, 2015). Still, blockchain enthu-
siasts maintain that this technology could contribute to
building a self-sovereign identity, or in other words, a
digital identity owned and controlled by the user – who
can then decide with whom and when to share infor-
mation contained in their ‘digital wallet’ (Tobin and
Reed, 2017).
International organisations, including the World
Bank, play an important role in promoting and assisting
states with the implementation of digital identity solu-
tions encompassing domestic as well as refugee popula-
tions (World Bank, 2018c). The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides refugee
registration using biometric data to verify identity
(UNHCR, 2018). The World Food Programme uses
blockchain technology to distribute aid (2018) while
theWorld Economic Forum supports financial inclusion
through technology (2018). The ID2020 Alliance, a
public–private initiative, also funds digital identity solu-
tions based on blockchain and biometric technologies in
less developed states (2019).
Presently, several states have implemented or are
considering digital identity solutions using these tech-
nologies. Besides India, Estonia has implemented a
digital citizenship model (e-Estonia, 2019). Australia
and Canada are currently exploring ways to adopt digi-
tal identity solutions (DIACC, 2019; DTA, 2019).
Guinea and Ivory Coast are leading the West Africa
Unique Identification for Regional Integration
and Inclusion programme on digital identity (World
Bank, 2018b).
Digital identity campaigns embraced by states can
operationalise their obligations under IHRL, giving
full effectiveness to everyone’s right to be recognised
as a person and to be treated equally before the law.
Such initiatives can work as equalisers of societal
disparity, providing excluded individuals with the
means to prove their identity and to access services.
In doing so, they function as enablers of opportunities
(Haenssgen and Ariana, 2018; Sen, 1992: 48) for those
individuals without proof of legal identity. These indi-
viduals have a limited set of opportunities when com-
pared to the rest of the world’s population. In this
regard, they are not free to do or to be whatever they
choose (Sen, 2005: 153). They do not have the oppor-
tunity to do what others take for granted, such as open-
ing a bank account or registering to attend school.
Digital identity technologies can facilitate access to
opportunities – and thus give choices to those individ-
uals. Besides, they may render those individuals with-
out legal documentation more visible and therefore less
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
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Complying with human rights and
non-discrimination law
Technology alone cannot protect human rights or pre-
vent discrimination. Depending on how digital identity
technologies are designed and used, they may also
hinder the rights of those that they intend to benefit.
These technologies can simultaneously include and
exclude individuals from protection. For example,
using blockchain technology to identify highly perse-
cuted groups of people such as the Rohingya minority
in Myanmar may allow them to access services in a host
country such as Bangladesh (Rohingya Project, 2018).
However, it may also allow for more efficient ways to
discriminate these populations since identification
makes them more visible. That could be for instance
the case with the marginalisation of ethnic minorities
such as the Uyghurs in China (Byler, 2019). Moreover,
the digitisation of identity is understandably not
exempt from cybersecurity threats (Singer and
Friedman, 2014: 34). Therefore, it may also present a
risk for their safety. If the information falls into the
wrong hands, it may facilitate persecution by authori-
ties targeting individuals based on their ethnicity.
Digital identity may thus be used to promote equal
treatment, but it can also contribute to discriminatory
practices, even if indirectly. IHRL prohibits any dis-
crimination based on race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status (Article 26,
ICCPR; Article 14, ECHR; Article 1, ACHR).
Indirect forms of discrimination occur when a rule
that is neutral in appearance leads to less favourable
treatment of an individual or a group of individuals on
one or more of these protected grounds. In the digital
identity context, it has been shown that biometric data
collected from older individuals are often of less good
quality (Rebera and Guihen, 2012). This is because
ageing and manual labour can both cause changes in
an individual’s biometric information. Solely relying on
biometric technology for identification and verification
can, therefore, affect older individuals more severely, as
their fingerprints and iris scans may not guarantee that
identity verification and identification will always be
possible (Abraham, 2018). As a result, they may experi-
ence obstacles in joining and using digital identity pro-
grammes. If access to services requires digital proof of
identity, they may also be excluded from these benefits.
Moreover, digital identity initiatives must be kept to
what is necessary for the fulfilment of their aim and not
go beyond what is proportionate to their objective.
States should not use the information collected for digi-
tal identification for any other purposes outside of what
individuals were informed of and had agreed to. In par-
ticular, states should not transform digital identity
platforms into tools for digital surveillance (Hu,
2017). As the ECtHR has noted ‘any State claiming a
pioneer role in the development of new technologies
bears special responsibility for striking the right balance
[between the State’s and the individuals’ interests]’
(S. and Marper v United Kingdom, para. 112). All the
more, states should be particularly careful when indi-
viduals affected by these technologies are amongst the
most vulnerable populations, such as refugees.
Digital identity solutions must be implemented
within systems design to comply with IHRL. Ideally,
non-discrimination considerations should be integrated
into the design of digital identity platforms from the
outset, leading to what could be described as ‘non-dis-
crimination by design platforms.’ Technical solutions
may take inspiration in the existing privacy and data
protection by design protocols (Rachovitsa, 2016).
Furthermore, teaching the basics of human rights law
to software engineers responsible for innovation in the
digital identity sphere could contribute to better com-
pliance with the legal requirements (Beduschi, 2018).
Scenario-based learning techniques could be used to
disseminate a better understanding of non-discrimina-
tion requirements and thus enhance software engineers’
preparedness to design technological solutions
responsibly.
Meeting data protection and privacy
imperatives
Finally, digital identity technology must also comply
with the legal requirements of data protection and priv-
acy. All states parties to international treaties on
human rights must respect, protect and fulfil the
rights to private life, home and correspondence
(Article 12, UDHR; Article 17, ICCPR; Article 8,
ECHR; Article 11, ACHR) of all individuals within
their jurisdiction. One’s right to private life encom-
passes one’s ‘personal identity,’ ‘aspects of physical
and social identity,’ (Pretty v United Kingdom, para.
61; Mikulic´ v Croatia, para. 53; Atala Riffo v Chile,
para. 135), a person’s right to their image (Axel
Springer AG v Germany, para. 83) and their personal
data, including biometric, genetic and electronic data
(S. and Marper v United Kingdom, para. 68). State inter-
ferences with this right can only be justified if they have
a legal basis in domestic law, pursue a legitimate aim
and are necessary and proportionate to that aim (Big
Brother Watch v United Kingdom, para. 304; Escher v
Brazil, para. 116).
Accordingly, domestic laws establishing digital iden-
tity programmes must determine with enough clarity
their scope of application, the safeguards they put in
place on data storage, duration, usage, destruction and
access of third parties, as well as the guarantees against
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arbitrariness and abuse. To illustrate, the Supreme
Court of India recently confirmed that these require-
ments applied to India’s Aadhaar programme, which
had been criticised for lacking a comprehensive privacy
safeguard mechanism (Justice K. S. Puttaswamy
(Retd.) and Anr. v Union of India, para. 153). The
same considerations apply to blockchain technology,
which presents significant risks unless the necessary
safeguards are implemented (Finck, 2018). Domestic
laws should require that technology developers imple-
ment such safeguards as a matter of design.
Public–private initiatives led by non-state actors
including private companies should align their practices
to the existing standards on privacy and data protec-
tion. In this regard, data protection rules provided by
the GDPR can be of assistance. These rules apply to
state and non-state actors alike, even though formally
their extraterritorial reach is limited to processing or
controlling of EU data subjects’ personal data
(Article 3, GDPR).
Two main aspects are particularly relevant to digital
identity providers. Firstly, the GDPR’s definition of
personal data encompasses ‘any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person’ (Article
4-1, GDPR). This definition is broader than, for
instance, the concept of personally identifiable informa-
tion used in the United States (Schwartz and Solove,
2011). Opting for the most comprehensive definition –
the one proposed by the GDPR, even when operating
outside of its remit – can provide a clear benchmark for
anyone deploying digital identity solutions. Secondly,
the GDPR puts forward a list of key requirements,
which include the principles of lawfulness, fairness,
transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation,
accuracy, storage limitation, data integrity and confi-
dentiality (Article 5, GDPR). Digital identity providers
should consider these requirements as part of the design
of technical and organisational measures (Article 25,
GDPR). Privacy by design and data protection by
design (Article 25-1, GDPR) can be instrumental in
avoiding common privacy and data breaches
(Omidyar Network, 2017; Rachovitsa, 2016;
Schartum, 2016). In doing so, digital identity providers
can contribute to the implementation of best practices
in matters of data protection wherever they operate.
Conclusion
New technologies have the potential to revolutionise
how individuals are identified and how their identity
is verified online. Such technologies may be a useful
tool to provide legal identification for those without
proof of identity, thus meeting the UN SDG Target
16.9. However, emerging digital identity platforms
will only effectively contribute to the protection of
human rights if they comply with IHRL, adequately
mitigate the risks of potential discrimination, and pro-
mote high standards of privacy and data protection.
Such considerations should be integrated into digital
identity platforms’ design from the outset. If innovators
and technology developers do so, they can promote
best practices and contribute to the implementation of
better levels of protection of human rights around the
world. Their actions in this field would thus ensure that
human rights remain relevant amid the rapid techno-
logical advances that have come to define our current
digital age.
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Appendix 1
Legal documents and case law
International treaties
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) 27 June 1981 (1982) 21 ILM 58.
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
22 November 1969 1144 UNTS 123.
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 4
November 1950 ETS 5.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 16 December 1966 999 UNTS 171.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A (III).
European Union
Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fin-
gerprints for the effective application of Regulation
(EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechan-
isms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an application for international protection
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lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country
national or a stateless person and on requests for the
comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law
enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforce-
ment purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No
1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the
operational management of large-scale IT systems in
the area of freedom, security and justice (Eurodac
Regulation) OJ L 180.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
(GDPR) OJ L 119.
Case law
European Court of Human Rights
Axel Springer AG v Germany, App no 39954/08
(ECtHR, 7 February 2012).
Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom, App nos
58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 13
September 2018).
Mikulic´ v Croatia, App no 53176/99 (ECtHR, 7
February 2002).
Pretty v United Kingdom, App no 2346/02 (ECtHR,
29 April 2002).
S. and Marper v United Kingdom, App nos 30562/04
and 30566/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008).
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Atala Riffo v Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No
254 (24 February 2012).
Escher v Brazil (Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Series C No. 200 (6 July 2009).
Supreme Court of India
Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v Union of
India and Ors (Supreme Court of India, 26 September
2018) Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012.
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